mis believed that without this identity the traditional account of the Ideas as at once ontological and epistemological standards cannot hold. Thus, I am suggesting that we see Plotinus' position here as that of a Platonist who says to his fellow Platonists: if you wish to hold, as you seem to do, that among first principles are included both a universal divine intellect and the Ideas, and that the Ideas are to serve as the ultimate standards not only of created things but also of knowledge, human or divine, you must believe that the Ideas are not only contained in the intellect, but exist as its thoughts. And to other dogmatic, i.e. non-sceptical, philosophers, whether of Platonist, Aristotelian or any other dogmatic persuasion, he has this to say: unless we postulate entities such as the Platonic Ideas and a universal divine intellect in which they reside and with which they are in fact identical, we must grant the sceptics their point and abandon any claims to secure knowledge. I shall address this issue by, first, considering two relevant texts, Ennead V. 5.1-2 and V. 3.5; then I proceed to discuss Plotinus' position from a wider angle, which involves among other things relating and comparing his views to Plato's, on the one hand, and to contemporary discussions about the notion of a given, on the other.
Ideas as divine thoughts
I do not wish to claim that Plotinus maintained his doctrine of the internality to the mind of the Ideas exclusively because of his concern with the sceptical points that are the focus of my discussion. In fact we find a doctrine claiming that the Ideas are the thoughts of or the products of a divine mind in such Platonist philosophers as Philo of Alexandria, Atticus, Alcinous and Numenius well before Plotinus.
2 I shall not venture to give an account of the origin and development of this doctrine among Platonists around the beginning of our era.
3 It seems of the Ideas. While pursuing Wallis's suggestions and using some of his conclusions, I tend to view Plotinus' use of scepticism as less direct than.he does. reasonable to suppose, however, that once Platonists had begun to take seriously the Idea of a divine mind as a principle of the world along with the Ideas -a development connected with the increasing prominence of the Timaeus'm the interpretation of Plato's thought 4 -considerations of economy and simplification suggested that the Ideas are thoughts of the divine mind. By Plotinus' time some such a view seems to have become widely accepted, though not at all universally. For instance, Longinus, a prominent Platonist philosopher and scholar and Plotinus' contemporary, rejected it, as did Porphyry until he became convinced of Plotinus' position after extensive exchange with Amelius, another of Plotinus' students. 5 Thus, in Plotinus' time it did not go without saying that a Platonist held the view that the Ideas are the thoughts of God. Hence, even if Plotinus was to some extent following a tradition, he did not hold the internality doctrine just because any respectable Platonist would hold it. Moreover, even if he took over the doctrine of the internality of the Ideas from his predecessors, Plotinus' version of it is quite distinct and goes beyond anything we can find in those predecessors.
It has been suggested that Plotinus' version of the internality doctrine receives its distinctive character from Plotinus' combination of the theory of Ideas with certain Peripatetic doctrines. 6 Briefly stated, the suggestion is that Plotinus identified the realm of the Ideas with the thoughts of a self-thinking intellect. While it is beyond dispute that Plotinus made use of this Aristotelian doctrine and that it strongly marks on his own account, Plotinus' originality does not lie in this; for as is well known Alcinous (or someone Alcinous relies on) had made the crucial step in this direction before Plotinus, even if less elaborately. 7 Rather, what is distinctive about Plotinus' internality doctrine Duckworth, 1977) is his use of it to deal with epistemological and ontological issues, whereby he in fact attempts to unify epistemology and ontology. This is what I shall now proceed to explore.
2. In the first two chapters of Ennead V. 5.(32) to which Prophyry gave the title "That the intelligibles are not outside the intellect and on the Good" 8 , Plotinus argues that the intelligibles are internal to the universal intellect. These chapters are quite difficult (but no more so than Plotinus usually is). They abound in argument sketches, where all the details are left out, no doubt because they are supposed to be obvious to Plotinus' intimates, who seem to be the assumed readership of his treatises; and there are several allusions to some unnamed "they", who are other philosophers that Plotinus is taking issue with.
Plotinus first affirms that the universal intellect is never wrong and never believes what is unreal. This entails-that the universal intellect always knows, never forgets, and that its knowledge is never based on guesswork or is ambivalent, nor is it second hand. Moreover, it is not based on demonstration. Plotinus dwells on the last point for a few lines. He says that even supposing that some of the knowledge possessed by the intellect is founded on demonstration, not all of it can be so founded. Some at least must be immediately evident to the intellect. This is of course just a statement of the familiar point that not everything can be proved, something must be assumed; and if the demonstration is supposed to yield knowledge, what is assumed must be known to be true without any further proof. Then Plotinus goes on to ask from where "they" (these are some unnamed philosophers) suppose intellect comes to have the clearness (το εναργές) about that which "they" admit to be immediately known. He then continues:
For it may even be doubted about that which seems clearest in sense-perception, whether it has its apparent existence not in [external] The point presumably is that the trustworthiness of those intellectual truths that are admitted to be self-evident cannot be founded on sense-perception, a doctrine Plotinus may take to be advocated by Aristotle in Posterior Analytics II, 19. This is so firstly because even in the case of the clearest sense-experiences, when they are unaided by reason and intellect, we can ask whether their objects exist only in our affections.
11 Secondly, even granting that what is to be grasped in sense-perception is in external sensible objects, nevertheless, what is known through sense-perception is only a representation of the thing, which itself remains external. This disqualifies the senses as the source of what is self-evident and true.
The question of what Plotinus means by the claim that the senses know only a representation of the object is of considerably importance. At first sight the point of Plotinus' remark might seem to be that in sense-perception we grasp only & subjective representation, something that pertains to us as perceivers. He might be calling what we are aware of through sense-perception a representation because it is a copy, existing in our senses, of the external object. But he may also be saying that what we perceive through the senses, even if it is an external object, is nevertheless a representation of the real thing itself. Which of these interpretations is adopted matters both for our understanding of the subsequent arguments in V. 5.1-2 and for our understanding of Plotinus' views on sense-perception. For in V. 5 Plotinus insists that as opposed to sense-perception, which apprehends mere representations, intellect must apprehend the things themselves. Obviously, we would have a better chance of understanding the latter claim, if we were clear about which kind of representation is involved.
If Plotinus means to say that sense-perception grasps only subjective representations, this would best be understood as an application of the general claim that no cognitive faculty can ever grasp anything external to it; a faculty must therefore either contain its objects all along or somehow acquire them. Since sense-perception does not contain the sensibles it perceives, it must somehow acquire them. But it cannot acquire the sensibles themselves, and must therefore do with representations of them, i. e. representations in the sense of sensory images, internal to the faculty of sense. Such an interpretation, neat as it may seem, runs into serious difficulties. It involves attributing to Plotinus views on sense-perception that square badly with his general doctrine. Plotinus generally .seems to take a strong realist position about the objects of sense-perception, and it would be disconcerting if he maintained the contrary here. 12 Moreover, in the passage quoted above Plotinus must be understood as saying that even if what sense-perception grasps is external, it is a representation. Hence, "the thing itself which is said to remain outside here must be something other than the external object perceived. It is also evident from other passages, where Plotinus discusses the internality of the objects of intellect, that the sense of "internal" he is after for the objects of intellect is a stronger sense than the one in which sensory images can be said to be internal to the faculty knowing them. For the apprehension of such images counts for him as of something external too.
13
So let us consider the second interpretation suggested above. According to this interpretation the distinction between the thing itself and its representation is not intended to mark a contrast between what is external to us and what is internal. It is rather that the sensible object, a collection of qualities in matter, is a representation of the non-perceptible nature or essence of the thing, which would then be what is meant by the "thing itself. Such a view, according to which the perceptible qualities of an object are representations or "images" of its essence, which is the real thing, is a standard Plotinian view.
14 In Plotinus this is just what sensible qualities are: they are the products in matter of the action of the imperceptible inner nature or essence (Aoyos, το τί) of a thing. 15 That this is what underlies his claim in V. 5.1 that sense-perception does not grasp the thing itself but a mere representation of it is supported by the beginning of chapter 2 of V. 5, where Plotinus summarizes the main points established in chapter 1. It becomes clear here that the "representation" (εΐδωλον), which sense-perception is supposed to grasp, is the quality of each thing as opposed to its essence or quiddity. 16 Thus, contrary to what one might suppose from these lines in chapter 1 taken in isolation, Plotinus is not saying that the senses 12 See e.g. IV. 6.1, 23-32; cf. IV. 5.1, 10-13. See also Emilsson, op. cit., chapters IV, VI and VIII. 13 Cf. V. 3.1-4 and V. 6.1. Plotinus claims that neither sensation of what goes on • within our bodies nor discursive thinking is knowledge of what is internal to the knowing faculty. 14 In general Plotinus calls the forms perceptible in matter representations (είδωλα, sometimes μιμήματα or εικόνες or other words meaning "image" or "shadow"). Thus, the general sense of "representation" in Plotinus is "ontologically derivative". All this is just standard Platonism based on such passages as Rep. VII 516A7; 520C4; Phdr. 250B2-D5; Soph. 239d4ff. Epist. VII 342B2 etc. 15 See e.g. II. 4.9; III. 8.2; IV. 4.29, 32-9 and especially VI. 3.15, 24-38. 16 The relevant lines run as follows: "But since we must bring in knowledge and truth and watchfully preserve being and the knowledge of the essence of each thing and not of its quality, since then we would have a representation ( In the remainder of the first chapter of V. 5 Plotinus argues directly against the externality of the intelligibles to the intellect itself. He repeatedly makes the point that if the intelligibles are external to the intellect, the intellect's apprehension of them would be like sense-perception, i. e. not of the things themselves, but of mere representations. He seems, in fact, to hold that no cognitive faculty whose objects are external can know its objects "themselves", but is bound to make do with representations. Thus, the interpretation we rejected above is at least right in attributing this general doctrine to Plotinus. So we should attempt to include this element of his views in our account.
Plotinus distinguishes between two kinds of acts of an object: an inner act and an outer act. The inner act is the thing itself, its essence; the outer act is something the thing produces in another.
17 Plotinus frequently describes this outer act as a representation of the inner act. The primary function of this doctrine is to account for the generation of a lower hypostasis from a higher one. In the Plotinian system this is often described in terms of two kinds of acts: the inner act constitutes the higher hypostasis, the outer the one generated from it. But even if the notion of the two acts is thus part of Plotinus' metaphysical doctrine, its origin is surely in ordinary phenomena such as light and heat. Fire and the heat it produces in the stove may serve as an illustration: fire has its own inner activity, burning, and it also has an outer one: the heat of the objects it renders hot. In Plotinus' view what we perceive through our senses is the object's outer acts, its qualities. Even what we colloquially call "the fire itself, the flame that we see, is merely a representation of the real fire itself in matter, and it is this representation that our senses grasp: Plotinus believes that in perception our sense-organs become qualified in a similar way as the object. 18 The important point relevant to the present issue is this: if the thing itself, i.e. the inner nature of the object, is external to the knowing subject* the latter can at most know the object through its external activities, its representations, not the object as it is in itself, for the subject can have no direct contact with it. The external act of the object has an impact on the senses and it is through this impact that we can perceive the object. But neither from this nor from the general doctrine that no faculty can know its object itself if the object is external to it, does it follow that the objects of sense-perception are subjective as opposed to objective representations. Nor did Plotinus think so.
In chapter 1 of V. 5 Plotinus argues further that if the objects of intellect are external to it, the intellect would not recognize justice and beauty, for instance, because the principles of judgement for justice and beauty would be outside the intellect (lines 29-33). A little later (lines 47-51) he says that if the objects of intellection are outside the intellect, the intellect would almost grasp something analogous to representations in gold made by some sculptor or engraver, and the intellect's awareness of them would be like sense-perception: a grasp of mere representations while the real thing (corresponding to the idea in the craftsman's mind) would escape it. And if the intellect grasped such representations of the real thing, he asks, why should one thing that the intellect grasps be justice and another beauty?
The point of these passages -a point Plotinus himself explicitly makes -is that unless the Ideas are really internal to the intellect, they (and thereby everything else) will be unknowable. The ultimate standards of truth for a Platonist are of course the Ideas; if they themselves are outside the divine mind and the divine mind has only representations of them, its knowledge will be second hand; the representation of justice that the divine mind had access to would be something that may have the quality of being just, but it would not be justice itself, only a mere impression of it. And in order to know the representation for what it is, i.e. the representation of justice, the divine mind would have to refer to the Idea itself; the representation would only be the Idea expressed in and through something other than itself/Hence, the intellect would need a ground or justification, which it in principle could not have, for declaring the representation of justice to be that representation rather than something else.
In chapter 2 of V. 5 Plotinus makes it clear that the mind with all its contents is evident to itself and that the real truth, which it contains, i. e. the Ideas, "does not agree with something else, but with itself, and there is nothing in addition to it, but what it says that is what it is, and what it is it also says".
19 I take the point of this to be the following: truth is ultimately not a matter of correspondence between different things -thought and object, language and reality or what have you. Rather, on the level of intellect, truth, knowledge and being all coin-19 Lines 18-20. I do not see that it is necessary to emend the text here as Theiler does, followed by H-S 2 and Armstrong. My translation is based on the H-Sj text, which involves only a very slight change (άλλο -> αλλ' δ). The general intention of the sentence is unaffected by these textual problems. A similar statement is to be found at V. 3.5 5 25-26.
cide. 20 The intellect's thinking is not true because it conforms to or corresponds to the ideas; it is true because it is the ideas, which are its thoughts. I shall later on consider in greater detail how Plotinus actually conceives of this identity. For now let us consider another aspect of Plotinus 5 internality doctrine.
In the chapter we have been considering, V. 5.1, we also find Plotinus making the following claim in support of his view that the Ideas must be internal to the intellect: "But if they [the intelligibles] are without intelligence (ανόητα) and life, what are they? Surely they are not προτάσεις, αξιώματα or λεκτά. For these would already say something about other things and would not be the real beings themselves, for instance 'the just is beautiful', the just and the beautiful being something else (άλλου του δικαίου και του κάλου οντο$)." (V. 5.1, 38-42) Plotinus' rejection of ττροτάσει$, αξιώματα and λεκτά as the intelligibles raises the question of non-propositional thought in Plotinus and has been the subject of discussion in a recent controversy about that issue. 21 A difficulty arises because it is not immediately clear precisely what προτάσεις, αξιώματα and λεκτά signify here 22 nor precisely what is the meaning of the last part of Plotinus' remark. He might be taken to be saying that justice and beauty are in fact different whereas the statement, 'the just is beautiful', asserts their identity. But as Lloyd has shown, this is not a plausible interpretation.
23 Plotinus must be saying that the intelligibles cannot be identified with statements such as "the just is beautiful", because the just and the beautiful themselves are different from the statement. But even if this is settled, Plotinus' words are still open to different interpretations. Depending on how προτάσεις, αξιώματα and λεκτά are understood, he may be affirming either the non-propositional character of the intellect and the intelligibles or their non-representational character. If he thinks of προ-τάσεις and the rest as abstract propositions, he would be doing the former; if he is focusing on the fact that they are representations of something else, he would be doing the latter. Lloyd argues that Plotinus must be denying that the intelligibles are 20 V. 5.3, 1-2; also V. propositions. 24 It goes without saying that the intelligibles are not expressions in the sense of spoken or written sentences, and Plotinus is surely not denying that absurd claim here. 25 But he may deem the view that they are statements entertained internally by the soul, sentences in a mental language, as it were, worth refuting. He held that there is such a level of representation, characteristic of the soul as opposed to the intellect: "As the spoken word (ό εν φωνή λόγος) is a representation (μίμημα) of that in the soul, so the word in the soul is a representation of that in something else [i. e. in the intellect]: as the uttered word (ό εν προφορά [λόγος]), then, is broken up into parts as compared with that in the soul, so is that in the soul as compared with that before it, which it interprets." 26 In V. 8.6, 1 -16 Plotinus mentions προτά-σεις and αξιώματα and speaks of them, in terms similar to those used here, as representations (είδωλα) of the original intelligibles.
27 These two passages combined suggest that -προτάσεις and the rest in V. 5.1, 38-42 are statements entertained by the soul, i. e. by discursive reason. It is not so clear that such statements are propositions as opposed to meaningful expressions internal to the soul. 28 At any rate, what Plotinus finds fault with in the claim that the intelligibles are such statements is that the statements are representations and the terms in them are not the things themselves, which would be that which the terms stand for. The divine intelligibles in the universal mind do not express (mean, correspond to or signify) something other than themselves. This is the point he wishes to make here, not that divine thoughts are nonpropositional in form. 24 Ibid, pp. 261 f. 25 In V. 8.6, 1 -16, a passage close to the present one in content, Plotinus clearly distinguishes between "statements" (αξιώματα) and their external expressions in spoken or written language. 26 I. 2.3, 27-31 (Armstrong's translation, slightly altered). Cf. also V. 1.3, 6-9. 27 Plotinus does not explicitly call προτάσεις and αξιώματα representations of the (true) intelligibles; but the εΐδωλον mentioned in V. 8.6, 10, "already unfolded and speaking discursively" is almost certainly to be identified with the προτάσεις and αξιώματα of lines 5 and 6. 28 Lloyd, "Non-propositional Thought in Plotinus", pp. 261 f., argues that the very point of Plotinus' remark on προτάσεις etc. here is that the thought of the intelligibles at the level of intellect (as opposed to the level of discursive reason) is non-propositional. He claims that Plotinus could not mean to say that the intelligibles are not expressions, because the Stoic λεκτά are never expressions, always what is or can be expressed. Plotinus does not use the word λεκτόν elsewhere, but it is clear from his other uses of πρότασις and αξίωμα in contexts similar to the one here that he takes them to be representations, things that express something other than themselves (see e.g. 1.3.4-5 and V. 8.5-6). But if Plotinus holds that προτάσεις and αξιώματα are kinds of expressions, he must hold the same of λεκτά, since he deals with all three at once in the same critical comment. However, Plotinus may well have believed that if divine thought is non-representational, it must be non-propositional. He may have thought so for the following reason: Even statements entertained by the soul, which have a propositional form, must be representations of something that is prior to them. For no statement, consisting of subject and predicate connected by the copula, is intelligible in itself, i. e. it can never be evident from the statement as such that a given subject has a given attribute. Sciences, deductive systems of propositions, try to make up for this by presenting a set of propositions in which a given proposition can be known to be true because it is related in such and such a way to other propositions in the system. In Plotinus' view, the truth of such systems and the understanding they manage to provide, however inadequately, are entirely dependent on the necessary relations obtaining between the objects spoken of in the science.
29 Genuine understanding is in Plotinus' view a direct intuition into these objects, intuition which reveals all the necessary connections and possibilities the natures in question contain.
How is such intuition different from understanding the propositions that constitute the principles of a science? Plotinus' intellect is a varied whole and its understanding -its self-understanding as it turns out to be -involves discernment of differences. 30 In that sense it involves a distinction between subject and attribute or something analogous to that. It may be described as propositional, if mere discernment of distinctions is all it takes for a thought to be "propositional". However, the understanding of the varied whole is a totum simul, something like seeing at once how all the truths of a science flow from an insight into the nature of its subject matter. This is obviously something more than what is involved in understanding a definition. Or not even this would be quite accurate: this kind of understanding constitutes all the truths, and constitutes them not as a collection of discrete items, but as an organic whole.
This leads us back to the question of how Plotinus conceives of the identity of the intelligibles and the intellect. What is the mode of think-29 This is brought out clearly in V. 8. 4-7. 30 This is very clearly expressed e. g. in V. 3.10, especially lines 40-5. Thus, even if I agree with Lloyd that thought on the level of intellect is for Plotinus a toium simul and agree with him also against Sorabji that non-discursive thought in Plotinus involves not only a rejection of inference but also of propositionality, I do not think that so called non-propositional thought in Plotinus is restricted to the thought of the universal genus of being as Lloyd suggests ("Non-propositional Thought in Plotinus", pp. 263-65).
ing in terms of the things themselves rather than mere representations of them? This is a large and complex issue that I cannot address in its entirety here. But I shall make a few comments concerning Plotinus' fullest presentation of it, the one he gives in V. 3. In this treatise Plotinus discusses the question of self-knowledge. He asks which of our cognitive faculties, if any, have self-knowledge. Sense-perception is ruled out on the ground that it only knows what is external to itself. Discursive reason, which in Plotinus' view is the faculty with which we identify our empirical self, is rejected as well for basically the same reason: it is concerned with representations that come to it from something else, i. e. from sense-perception below, as he puts it, and from intellect above (chapter 3). However, he does seem to hold that discursive reason has self-knowledge of a sort: it knows, for instance, that it is discursive reason, that it gains understanding of the things outside it, and that it judges what it judges. But this is not genuine self-knowledge, because discursive reason knows these things discursively, i.e. by means of representations derived from the pure intellect (chapter 4, 15-28). Thus, discursive reason is not directly reflexive.
Intellect, however, is. In the next chapter Plotinus develops what is perhaps the subtlest and philosophically most interesting of his many accounts of the nature of intellect. The first point to be established is that for intellect to have a more perfect kind of self-knowledge than discursive reason, it cannot be, as it were, two things unified into one thing so that it knows itself in the sense that one part, the subject side, knows the other, the object side of thought. In that case intellect as a whole would not know itself completely, for the thinker-side would not know itself at all. Thus, we have a claim to the effect that even a subject-object distinction in the intellect is incompatible with its selfknowledge. The subject, what we have called the thinker-side, must be immediately known to itself. . . The notion Plotinus is trying to get at is that of a consciousness which is essentially self-directed and transparent. 31 The claim that complete self-knowledge or self-consciousness is indeed possible for intellect and that it is not a knowledge of part by part seems to be a reaction to certain sceptical arguments such as we find in Sextus Empiricus against the possibility of intellect's apprehension of itself.
32 Sextus ar- gues that intellect's apprehension of itself must be either of part by part, in which case it would not be genuine self-knowledge but in fact apprehension of another, just as Plotinus claims; or else it is apprehension of whole by whole, which he claims is impossible, for the whole intellect would then be apprehension (κατάληψη) and there would not be anything left to be apprehended. Plotinus, as we have seen, agrees with the former point, but he is willing to take the second horn of the dilemma. It seems to him that knowledge of whole by whole is indeed possible, if we adopt a suitable theory of intellect and its objects. Let us look more closely into how Plotinus thinks he can achieve this. The next step in Plotinus' reasoning is unfortunately obscurely stated, but from its position in the argument it is clear that it is of supreme importance (lines 15-21). He argues here against a division between subject and object in intellect's thinking. He now brings together three central notions: that of intellect's complete self-knowledge; the notion of the intelligibles as the real original objects as opposed to mere representations; and the unity of subject and object in intellection. The passage runs as follows (I translate as literally as possible): Perhaps [intellect] will add the one who has contemplated from itself, in order that it may have thought itself completely; but if [it adds] also the one who has contemplated, then [it adds] at the same time also that which has been seen. If now the contemplated belongs to the contemplation, if [these contemplated objects] are impressions of them, it does not have them themselves; on the other hand, if it has them themselves, it does not have them by seeing them as a result of dividing itself, but it both saw them and had them prior to the division. If this is so, the contemplation must be the same as the contemplated and the intellect the same as the intelligible. (V. 3.5, 17-23).
Unfortunately I am not confident that I follow Plotinus' argument here step by step, but it seems to me that considerations such as the following are at least a part of what he is saying: It is assumed here that intellect knows the original intelligibles or Ideas themselves rather than impressions or representations of them. Suppose now that the thinking subject includes itself as its own object. Then, in the same act as the subject apprehends itself, it will also apprehend the objects of its thought. (This claim is only affirmed, not argued for.) Now, these objects as apprehended in that act whereby the intellect apprehends itself are either impressions or originals. If the subject as such does not contain the originals, it could only see impressions by directing itself toward itself, for there were no originals there. But this cannot be so, for intellect knows the originals. Hence, the supposition that intellect is divided into a subject that does not contain its objects and a side to which only the objects belong must be rejected. Hence, if intellect knows the things themselves, the subject must be seen and contained the originals from the beginning. This is really a reductio argument against the hypothesis that the intellect is divided into a subject side and an object side on the assumption that intellect does in fact possess the real things themselves. Then, Plotinus moves on to restate a point familiar from V. 5: the intellect must know the real things themselves, else there can be no truth: "For truth ought not to be of something else, but what it says, that it should also be." (lines 25 f.) This results in a theory which posits just one kind of item, namely acts of thought or thinking activity. Plotinus invites us to reject the model of a passive empty intellect that may on occasion become informed and engaged in thought when thinking of an object presented to it. Instead, we are to think of an intellect that always thinks and does nothing but think. In fact the very being of this intellect is just the activity of thinking. Thus, there is no distinction between the agent and its activity -that distinction is relevant only in the case of agents that may or may not act, may or may not take on this or that form. Furthermore, the identity of the object of thought with the thinker requires that the object be the activity of thinking. This enables Plotinus to say that the intellect's thinking is its self-thinking, constituting immediate self-knowledge. 33 Let us look more closely into what lies behind these claims.
The whole dialectic about the thing itself and its representations, whether in human souls or in nature, assumes that any form that is expressed in some matter or other is a representation. Such a form is always a case of something which "is in another", as Plotinus likes to put it, and not "in itself'." Various Platonic and Aristotelian considerations suggest this. 34 Any composite of form and matter that is F requires that there be something that is F all on its own, is essentially and necessarily F and not just F expressed in something else, which hence is at most contingently F. Reflection upon this also suggests, that that which is essentially and originally F must be something active or, more precisely, that it is the very act of F-ing. (It must be the very 33 The content of this paragraph emerges from the rest of chapter 5 of V. 3, i. e.
lines 29-49. 34 For the primacy of forms over compounds of form and matter and the primacy of separate forms over forms of sensible substances in Aristotle see M. Frede, "The Unity of General and Special Metaphysics: Aristotle's Conception of Metaphysics", chapter 6 of Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).
activity of F-ing in some way analogous to the way in which one might say that a source of light is the very activity of illuminating.) At any rate, it seemed to Plotinus that thinking is a plausible candidate for something that satisfies these conditions. Given the doctrine of intellect that I described above, according to which the object of thought and the activity of thought are one and the same thing, the activity of thinking F (the very act of F-ing) is a good case for something which is F without matter, of something which is the pure actuality of F, is essentially F in virtue of just itself. Thus, the essence of F, the intelligible F and the Idea of F all turn out to be the very same thing: pure Fthoughts. Thus, what Plotinus is trying to get at in his claim that the universal intellect's thinking is what it says and says what it is is a notion of something which cannot fail to be known such as it is and cannot fail to be such as it is known. This he thinks he can achieve by letting the Ideas be the very thoughts themselves. Even if we can understand the philosophical motivation for such a claim and perhaps also understand how this is a clever but natural move for a Platonist influenced by Aristotle to make, we might still wish we had a clearer grasp of what this kind of thinking is supposed to be like. I am afraid I do not have much to offer here in addition to what has already been said. Plotinus' descriptions of divine thinking tend to be primarily negative, stressing the difference between divine thinking and our ordinary discursive kind of thought, or else they are excessively metaphorical. The intelligibles are not supposed to be representations of any kind. They are not supposed to be known like mental representations that we inspect on, as it were, an inner television screen. Furthermore, Plotinus makes it clear that they are known directly without any inference whatsoever. Plotinus is fond of using visual analogies and metaphors to emphasize the immediateness of divine thinking and to suggest that it is a grasp of many at once; but he also stresses the inadequacy of such metaphors, since they suggest an external and not an internal object. 35 If we can imagine a kind of thinking that satisfies these conditions, that is what divine thinking is like according to Plotinus.
Even if we were willing to admit that the foregoing shows how divine thinking, being identical with its objects, has a secure foundation, we may well retain doubts as to whether our human knowledge is any better off thereby. We may grant Plotinus that identity of the subject and the object of thought is a necessary condition of 35 V. 3.8 and V, 5.7 illustrate this well. Passages using vivid visual metaphors to describe intellection abound in the Enneads.
infallibility. But since this identity is a peculiar feature of the universal divine mind, it seems that we humans are just as liable to sceptical arguments as before* Not so in Plotinus* opinion, For one of his characteristic doctrines is that the human mind is in its essence one with the universal divine mind. Even if our ordinary thinking is in terms of representations and hence not the sort of thinking the universal intellect is constantly and eternally engaged in, nevertheless we can momentarily rise to that sort of thinking ourselves, which for Plotinus means that we can become the universal intellect. 36 Plotinus also insists that ordinary discursive thinking depends on the universal non-discursive thinking.
37 Discursive thinking is in terms of representations and we obtain such representations by unfolding, as Plotinus puts it, the thoughts at the level of the universal intellect. The idea seems to be that we become conscious of the intelligibles only indirectly by reflecting images of them on an inner mirror, as he puts it. 38 The intelligibility of such representations depends on our use of their models on the level of the intellect. Thus, when I see a certain representation as the representation of justice, that is because some aspect of my mind has access to and is using the original Idea of justice itself, even if I do not have a second order awareness of this. Even if we are not aware of the original intelligibles in our everyday thinking, nevertheless, their being there such as they are and our mind's being somehow in contact with them is a necessary condition of our thoughts. This is of course not an answer that would convert a sceptic. But then, that is not what Plotinus is up to. He is not trying to persuade the sceptic who doubts the possibility of human knowledge. Even if there is no explicit discussion of this in the Enneads, I suspect that the structure of Plotinus' reasoning about this matter is rather along the following lines: Scepticism must be rejected because the sceptic cannot help assuming some of the truths he seeks to doubt.
39 Nevertheless, sceptical arguments are instructive in that they show that no commonsensical epistemic naturalism will do. So, rather than attempting to show where the sceptic goes wrong, Plotinus sees it as his task to find adequate assumptions that provide a foundation of knowledge that is immune to sceptical attacks.
Plotinus' internal intelligibles and the philosophical tradition
. .In Plato's dialogues the Ideas are supposed to be causes of sensible things, which have the character they do in virtue of participating in the Ideas or imitating them. The Ideas are perfectly that which they cause in other things; or otherwise stated they necessarily and essentially are that which other things only contingently and superficially 36 Cf. VI. 5.7, [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] . Our "real self is always at the level of intellect cf. I. 1.7, 9; I. 4.9, [28] [29] [30] VI. 4.14 etc. 37 See e.g. V. 1.3 and V. 3.4. 38 See I. 4.10 and IV. 3.30. . 39 Plotinus may be stating a reply to the sceptics along these lines in V. 5.2, 21-5. are. Thus, we may say that the Ideas are perfect standards of what else there is. But the Ideas are not only standards of what is, they are also standards of knowledge. They are, according to Plato, the only objects of knowledge and, moreover, they are supposed to be such that once we have made acquaintance with them, there is no room for error or doubt with respect to them: they somehow bear their true identity on their surface so that in their case appearance and reality collapse into one another. Plato clearly thought that any kind of scepticism with respect to the knowledge of the Ideas is precluded: in their case there is no veil of appearance between them and the knowing subject. By postulating entities such as the Ideas in which the standards of being and the standards of knowledge coincide, Plato thought that he could avoid the perils of relativism and scepticism widespread in his own times. That is exactly what Cherniss has called "the philosophical economy of the theory of Ideas".
40
I suggest that we see Plotinus as being in perfect agreement with the Platonic program. Moreover, he shares with Plato all the essential views about the nature of the Ideas: they are necessarily what they are; and they are standards and causes of whatever else there may be; furthermore, they are standards of knowledge: we refer to the Ideas or rely on our knowledge of them when passing judgements on sensible things 41 and they themselves are self-authenticating to the mind thinking them. Plotinus only insists that if the ultimate standard of, say justice, and the ultimate standard of judgement of what is just are to be one and the same thing, that standard must be internal to the universal mind, which is responsible for carrying out the creation of the world and whose thought is the source of all other thought.
To us it may seem natural to see what Plotinus is doing as a correction of Plato. He may sound like someone saying that Plato was essentially right, but failed to see that the Ideas must be internal to the divine mind and his doctrine must be set straight in that respect, which could easily be done with a little help from Aristotle, especially from Metaphysics XII. Plotinus himself, however, almost certainly did not 40 We have seen at least some of the considerations that prompt Plotinus to claim that the Ideas must be inside the intellect: any external cognition is in his view bound to be of mere representations and not of the things as they are in themselves. In this he was influenced by the sceptical tradition. There is another feature of Plotinus 5 position which may also indicate awareness of sceptical threats. This is his insistence, which he expresses in various ways in different places, that the intelligibles (the Ideas) are really ultimate standards of what there is and are knowable as such standards. Somehow, the intellect, when contemplating the intelligible justice or beauty, cannot go wrong, and whatever it thinks is self-explanatory and transparent to it. Of the modes productive of suspension of judgement attributed to Agrippa one is the mode of "throwing one back ad infinitum". It is used "when what is brought forward as a warrant for the matter in question needs another warrant, which itself needs another, and so on ad infinitum". 44 This mode proved particularly useful as a means of attacking any intended demonstration or an intended criterion of judgement. 45 As soon as a criterion or a demonstration was proposed the sceptic would ask for a criterion by reference to which the proposed criterion is justified or for a demonstration of what is assumed in the given demonstration. Even if Plotinus does not refer explicitly to this kind of argument, his insis- PHI 125; II 20, 36, 78, 85, 90; M VII 339, 340, 429; VIII 16, 21. tence on the self-authenticating aspect of divine intellection may indicate that he was aware of it and wanted to preclude its application.
The central feature of Plotinus' doctrine of the internality of the Ideas and of his proposed solution to the problem of how the divine mind can know the Ideas themselves is the claim that truth on the level of intellect "does not agree with something else, but with itself, and there is nothing in addition to it, but what it says that is what it is, and what it is is what it says". 46 In this doctrine we see the notion that the standard or criterion of F must at once be that very thing of which it is the standard or criterion, namely F, and in being F it must somehow "say" that it is F. Intellect's thought of F is not true because it corresponds to F itself; it is F itself, and being F itself and at the same time a thought, it is the knowledge and announcement of F.
Such a notion in which knowledge and reality coincide may look mysterious. One can nevertheless readily see the philosophical motivation which lies behind it: Plotinus is, on the one hand, seeking selfauthenticating knowledge for the divine mind, and, on the other hand, ontological primacy for the Ideas, the objects of divine thought. Thus, this notion has both an epistemological and an ontological aspect. The epistemological claim, which places self-authenticating knowledge in the subjective realm, in immediate awareness of some sort, has many parallels in the history of philosophy: it is for instance akin to Descartes' cogito and the notion of the given as sense-impressions that pervades the empirical tradition. It is especially instructive to compare Plotinus here with the empiricists. In the empirical tradition there is to be found, mostly implicit rather than explicit, the notion of items which are at once supposed to be items of a certain kind and instances of knowledge of that kind. That is to say in the empirical tradition a given sensation (sense datum, impression, sensum, phenomenal quality) is supposed to be both something green and awareness of, or knowledge of, something green.
47 Such items may seem to provide a solid foundation of knowledge and meaning, for they seem to bridge the gap between what is and what is within the reach of our minds: the very same thing is an F and is our direct awareness of F. Plotinus' notion of the intelligible as something that bears the mark of truth shares the formal features of notion of the given in the empiricist tradition as characterized by 5.2, cf. V. 3.5, . The last passage is Plotinus' most vivid expression of the notion of self-authenticating being. 47 See W. Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 9f., 129-34 and 156-61. lars: it both is and is the awareness of being such as it is. There are important differences, however, between Plotinus and the empiricists. First, intellect's thought in Plotinus is genuinely a thought and not a quasi-sensual item. Secondly and more importantly, the content of intellect's thought in Plotinus is self-determined. 48 That is to say, the intellect is not engaged in recognizing something as F which is F prior to and independently of the intellect's thinking so. On the contrary, F itself is constituted in and by the thought. 49 Thus, Plotinus' notion of self-authenticating knowledge is not vulnerable to the objection that a wedge may be stuck in between the concept F and what is immediately given.
My account of Plotinus' views on this matter has focused on the epistemological issues at the expense of ontological ones. This may give a distorted picture of Plotinus' concerns. I shall now, finally and very briefly, try to do something to rectify that injustice. Plotinus is of course not only concerned with showing that there can be something epistemically given; he is also and no less interested in showing that there can be real things, substances or essences, i. e. things that satisfy traditional Greek criteria of being such as they have been laid down by Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle/Moreover, he wishes to see to it that what is epistemically given is the real things. How does he think he can manage this? We saw above that in Plotinus' view thoughts on the level of intellect satisfy the requirements that beings in the full sense of the term must satisfy: each of them is fully what it is and in general they satisfy all the important conditions of Platonic Ideas. They are self-sufficient and essentially active things. It is of course no accident that these beings coincide with what is epistemologically primary: divine thoughts have both the required epistemological properties and satisfy the conditions of being. Is this sheer metaphysical luck? No, not quite. To suggest that it is mere luck is to suggest that it is in virtue of distinct, and, hence, potentially separable properties, that divine thoughts are ontologically primary, on the one hand, and epistemically primary, on the other. But in Plotinus' view this is not so. Divine thoughts are ontologically primary because they are pure acts, and they are epistemically primary in virtue of the same feature (see above). 48 In a certain sense intellect and its contents are of course determined by the One, However, in the Plotinian hierarchy actual beings first appear on the level of intellect so that for any being, F, there is no prior F to the F on the level of intellect. 49 Cf. V. 1.4, 28; VI. 7.40, [10] [11] [12] The preceding considerations show that Plotinus' doctrine of the internality of the Ideas is not a mere Neoplatonic idiosyncrasy. In his elaboration of this doctrine Plotinus approaches the tradition in philosophy that places the foundation of knowledge in the subjective realm, i. e. immediate self-knowledge becomes the primary kind of knowledge. 50 As such knowledge is identical with its object and its object is the realm of being, he becomes a sort of idealist as well. 51 The divine intellect is indeed the measure of all things in the sense that what it thinks, that is indeed so. However, this idealism and subjectivism hold primarily for the universal divine intellect and only for ours in so far as we are identical with it. As the divine intellect is unique and universal, its subjectivism does not entail relativism of any sort for the rest of us; in fact quite the contrary. 52 50 That Neoplatonism involved such a turn and that it can be explained as a reaction to scepticism is noted by Hegel in his introduction to the Neoplatonists in Die Geschichte der Philosophie III. See also M. Forster, Hegel and Skepticism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 40 and 90. 51 A qualification is needed here. The One is, of course, Plotinus' highest principle and in his developed doctrine it does not think and is beyond being; but intellect is both the realm of true being and the principle of derivative being; hence, true being is mental, and everything depending on it, insofar as it is, is a kind of contemplation, θεωρία (cf. especially the treatise III. 8: "On nature and contemplation and the One"). 52 I am grateful to Patricia Kenig Curd, Zeph Stewart and Steven K. Strange for reading earlier versions of this paper and given me careful substantial and stylistic comments. I have also benefitted from discussions with Michael Frede, Dominic O'Meara, Allan Silverman, Robert Turnbull, Donald Morrison, Calvin Normore and audiences at various universities where I have presented earlier versions of the paper.
